180Gambler Reference on games of chance

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How regulation developed

Field: Regulation. This page was last modified on 17 August 2026.

Regulation of games of chance has moved through three broad phases: prohibition, licensing, and technical supervision. Each phase was a response to the failure of the one before it, and the third phase is distinctive because it regulates arithmetic rather than premises, which is a direct consequence of the games themselves becoming software.

Timeline rule marking the periods discussed in this article1800sprohibition1931first licensing1960sstatutory regimes1980stechnical tests2000sonline regimes
The broad phases of regulatory approach. The phases overlap, and several coexist today in different jurisdictions.

Prohibition and its limits

The nineteenth-century approach in most of the English-speaking world was to prohibit commercial gambling, usually by making the keeping of a gaming or betting house an offence rather than by pursuing individual wagers. The distinction was practical: premises could be found and closed, while private bets could not realistically be policed.

The consistent result was displacement rather than elimination. Suppressed betting houses became street betting, suppressed lotteries became illegal number games, and both operated without any of the protections a legal market might have carried. The recurring argument for the next phase was not that gambling was harmless but that an unsupervised market was worse than a supervised one.

Licensing

The licensing phase begins with the legalisation of casino gambling in Nevada in 1931, which established the template still in use: an activity permitted only to a named licence holder, with the licence conditional on suitability, subject to inspection, and revocable. Britain's Betting and Gaming Act of 1960 did the same for betting offices, which opened the following year, and the Gaming Act of 1968 tightened the regime for casinos after the first legislation proved looser than intended.

Other jurisdictions followed with their own variants. New Jersey approved casino gambling by referendum in 1976 with a regime built around a dedicated control commission. In the United States, federal legislation in 1988 established the framework for gaming on tribal lands. The unifying idea across all of them is that the regulator's principal instrument is the licence: something valuable that can be conditioned and withdrawn.

Regulating the arithmetic

Licensing supervises who may operate. It says little about whether a given machine does what it claims. As games moved into software during the 1980s, that gap became the main regulatory problem, because the outcome of a play is no longer visible in the mechanism. A wheel can be inspected by eye; a stop table cannot.

The response was technical standards enforced through independent testing. In broad terms a modern regime requires that the random number generator pass statistical tests for uniformity and independence, that it be seeded and cycled in a way that is not predictable from observation, that the declared return be recomputable from the paytable and the outcome probabilities, that the software in the field match the version that was tested, and that significant events be logged in a form that survives a power failure and can be audited.

Objects of supervision in each phase
PhasePrincipal objectInstrument Failure it addresses
ProhibitionPremisesCriminal offence Open commercial operation
LicensingOperatorConditional licence Unsuitable operators, unpoliced markets
TechnicalGame and softwareTesting and certification Undeclared or altered probabilities
OnlineOperator and jurisdictionLicensing plus payment and access rules Cross-border supply outside any regime

Cross-border supply

Remote gambling broke the assumption underlying both earlier phases, namely that an operator and a customer share a jurisdiction. From the late 1990s, operators licensed in one place served customers in another, sometimes in places where the activity was prohibited. The regulatory responses divided into two families: prohibitionist measures aimed at the supporting infrastructure, particularly payments, and licensing measures that admitted remote operators on condition they accept local supervision and taxation.

Britain's Gambling Act of 2005 is the clearest example of the second family, creating a single commission with jurisdiction over remote as well as land-based operators, later extended to require a local licence for any operator serving local customers. Several federal measures in the United States illustrate the first, including the 2006 statute directed at the processing of payments connected to unlawful internet gambling.

What regulation does not change

It is worth being precise about the limits. Technical regulation verifies that a game is what it says it is: that the generator is random, the paytable is as declared, and the return is correctly computed. It does not alter the return, and it cannot. A fully certified game with a declared return below one is still a game whose expected value is negative, and the law of large numbers applies to it exactly as it applies to an uncertified one. Certification is a statement about honesty, not about favourability, and the two are routinely confused.